Capturing Feedback in Complex Marine Ecosystems: Two Models by Johnson, Teresa R.
The University of Maine
DigitalCommons@UMaine
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Fogler Library
5-2001
Capturing Feedback in Complex Marine
Ecosystems: Two Models
Teresa R. Johnson
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/etd
Part of the Oceanography Commons
This Open-Access Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UMaine. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UMaine.
Recommended Citation
Johnson, Teresa R., "Capturing Feedback in Complex Marine Ecosystems: Two Models" (2001). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 27.
http://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/etd/27
CAPTURING FEEDBACK IN COMPLEX MARINE ECOSYSTEMS: 
TWO MODELS 
Teresa R. Johnson 
A.B. Bowdoin College, 1997 
A THESIS 
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Science 
(in Marine Policy) 
The Graduate School 
The University of Maine 
May, 2001 
Advisory Committee: 
James A. Wilson, Professor of Marine Sciences and Resource Economics and 
Policy, Chairperson 
James M. Acheson, Professor of Anthropology and Marine Sciences 
Robert S. Steneck, Professor of Marine Sciences 
CAPTURING FEEDBACK IN COMPLEX MARINE ECOSYSTEMS: 
TWO MODELS 
By Teresa R. Johnson 
Thesis Advisor: Dr. James A. Wilson 
An Abstract of the Thesis Presented 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
Degree of Master of Science 
(in Marine Policy) 
May, 2001 
Marine systems are complex and highly variable. Feedback is required to learn in 
and manage these systems. Unfortunately, feedback in complex marine systems is difficult to 
capture and ambiguous. 
Feedback is a function of system structure. Conventional fisheries management 
simplifies this structure by focusing on individual species. It assumes that variability in 
populations is due solely to changes in the adult population (i.e., that a stock-recruitment 
relationship exists) and all necessary feedback is available by simply observing the size of 
the adult population. Unfortunately, this approach does not consider the environment of the 
species and most marine stocks show poor functional stock-recruitment relationships. 
Complex systems (hierarchy) theory suggests that this approach may not be the most 
appropriate way to simplify the system. Hierarchy theory simplifies the system on the basis 
of nearly decomposable subsystems, whose boundaries are defined by rates of interactions. It 
implies that feedback can be captured more readily within than between subsystems and that 
there is more pattern stability at the subsystem level than at the species level in the system. 
This implies that feedback is best captured from subsystems, not from changes in the 
abundance of indiiidual species. 
Fishermen have traditionally dealt with variability by utilizing one of two harvesting 
strategies. With the Little Box approach, fishermen target a single species across multiple 
subsystems, averaging the variability. With the Big Box approach, fishermen target multiple 
species within a subsystem, relying on the relative stability of that subsystem. We 
+ 
hypothesize if less noise exists at the subsystem level than at the species level, then better 
feedback can be gained with a Big Box approach to management. 
Two age-structured, multispecies, bioeconomic models were created to explore the 
two harvesting rights regimes described above in terms of how well they allow decision- 
makers to capture and respond to feedback. The Little Box model allocates rights to single 
species across subsystems. The Big Box model allocates rights to multiple species within a 
I 
subsystem. 
Results of the models illustrate significant advantages for sole ownership compared to 
open access. The baseline model assumes a sole owner with perfect abilities and high quality 
and timely information. Results show little difference between Big Box and Little Box 
management under these "perfect" conditions. The model was then run under various 
scenarios to reflect imperfect feedback conditions (e.g., measurement errors, delayed 
response times). Impairment of the sole owner's ability to respond to feedback and 
degradation of the quality of feedback resulted in advantages for the Big Box sole owner 
over the Little Box sole owner. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS OF COMPLEXITY IN MARINE SYSTEMS 
Introduction 
Complex systems are found everywhere -examples include social systems (e.g., 
formal organizations), biological systems (e.g., organisms), physical systems (e.g., matter), 
and symbolic systems (e.g., books composed of chapters, sentences, words, etc.) (Simon, 
1962). There is a large body of literature devoted to the study of the organization and 
behavior of complex systems. This theory spans multiple disciplines including physics, 
mathematics, biological sciences, computer programming, economics, and the social 
sciences (Simon, 1962; Pattee, 1973; 07Neill et al, 1986; Waldrop, 1992). Researchers 
from these diverse disciplines have made progress towards understanding complex systems 
and recognize hierarchy theory as the tool most useful in understanding the organization 
and behavior of complex systems. This is because, as we will see, hierarchy "is one of the 
central structural schemes that the architect of complexity uses" (Simon, 1962). 
Marine ecosystems are complex systems (e.g., Steele, 1974; Cushing, 1975; 
Laevastu, 1996; Levin, 1999) and some may even be chaotic (e.g., Wilson et. al., 1991). 
Similar to other complex systems, they are characterized by strong (often non-linear) 
interactions, complex feedback loops, time and space lags, discontinuities, thresholds and 
limits (Costanza et al., 1993; Holling, 1987). Complexity creates many difficulties for those 
seeking to manage marine resources (Ludwig et al, 1993; Dayton, 1998). Conventional 
fisheries management tries to simplify this complexity by focusing on individual species 
populations. Additionally, the conventional approach typically seeks to reduce fishing 
mortality by controlling fishing effort. Rules utilized by this approach usually focus solely 
on numerical controls (e.g., Wilson et al, 1994; Acheson and Wilson, 1996). Marine 
resource managers are now struggling to improve this approach in order to address the 
.complex nature of the environment (e.g., Sherman, 199 1; OECD, 1997). In particular, there 
is increasing interest in developing an ecosystem approach to management (e.g., Sherman, 
1991; Apollonio, 1994; Larkin, 1996; Laevastu, 1996; NMFS, 1998; and Fogarty and 
Murawski, 1998; Wilson, 2001). 
One significant source of difficulty resulting from the complex nature of the system 
lies in learning how to make meaningful management decisions (i.e., how to know if rules 
will result in sustainable resource use) (Wilson, 2001). The variability and complexity of 
interactions in the system make it impossible for us to predict the results of our actions. 
Unless we know how the system will respond to human intervention (or how our actions 
may influence the structure and function of the system) we cannot make informed 
decisions. Additionally, with this uncertainty, particularly regarding the future of the 
system, users have little or no incentive to adopt a conservation or stewardship ethic. This is 
because a user only has an incentive to restrain hisher activities today if they believe they 
will receive benefits from that restraint in the future. With the high levels of variability and 
complexity in the system, users cannot be assured that they will benefit from any 
conservation efforts that they make. 
Holland (1998) describes the difficulties of learning in complex systems and offers 
insight into how pattern feedback can facilitate the learning process.' Holland (1998) uses 
the example of the checker board game to illustrate how, with feedback, we can learn how 
the system responds to outside influences such as exploitation and management. Holland 
explains how we unconsciously use feedback in our everyday lives to develop conceptual 
models that allow us to cope with the uncertain nature of the complex world around us. In 
creating these models, we focus on the important components and interactions in the system 
and ignore unnecessary details. With these models, we learn how to act and what we might 
expect will result from our actions. 
' Feedback can be defined simply as: "Influence on a system component mediated by changes induced by 
that component" (Levin, 1999, 233). 
2 
Ulanowicz (1997) similarly describes how with "propensities" we can find order in 
complex systems.2 Propensities are the tendencies that certain circumstances might occur 
within a given context (Ulanowicz, 1997,37) and are basically probabilities that are 
contingent upon circumstances and interfering events (Ulanowicz, 1997,38). By paying 
attention to system propensities, it is possible to gain at least a qualitative understanding of 
the system. 
However, as will be discussed, the nature of feedback (and propensities) in complex 
systems is imperfect, which has important implications for fisheries management. This 
chapter reviews complexity and hierarchy theory and attempts to apply these concepts to the 
study and management of marine systems. After reviewing the theory of complex systems 
and describing marine systems as complex, the implications of this complexity, particularly 
the problems posed by imperfect feedback, are explored. 
What are Complex Adaptive Systems? 
Simon (1962) defined a complex system as "one made up of a large number of 
parts that interact in a nonsimple way." Simon (1962) further explained that "complexity 
frequently takes the form of hierarchy and that hierarchic systems have some common 
properties that are independent of their specific content." O'Neill et al. (1986) extensively 
reviewed hierarchy theory as it is applicable to understanding the structure and function of 
ecosystems. Properties common to hierarchic complex systems, as described primarily by 
Simon (1962, 1996) and O'Neill et al(1986), are summarized in the following ~ection.~ 
Nearly Decomposable Subsystems 
Hierarchy theory finds that complex systems are composed of multiple subsystems 
that are described as nearly decompo~able.~ By nearly decomposable, it is meant that 
Ulanowicz borrows the concept of propensities from Karl Popper. 
Many ideas of this section also resulted from of a seminar discussion on ecological approaches to fisheries 
management led by Dr. James Wilson at the University of Maine in the Spring 2000. 
Subsystems are simply the individual components that make up the system. 
despite interactions between subsystems, boundaries can still be defined. At a given level in 
the hierarchy, subsystem boundaries are distinguished on the basis of rates - rates of 
interactions. Interactions are more frequent and intense within subsystems than between 
subsystems. Also, the subsystems themselves can be viewed as hierarchic in structure until 
some lowest subsystem level. The levels in the hierarchy are nearly decomposable because 
they can be isolated from each other according to the distinctly different rates at which they 
operate. Processes "higher" in the hierarchy exhibit slower rates than processes at the 
"bottom" of the hierarchy (O'Neill et al, 1986). Again, the subsystems (and components 
of subsystems) are considered nearly decomposable since they can be isolated from each 
other. Hierarchy theory allows us to simplify complex adaptive systems by focusing on the 
near redundancy that is inherent in their organization (Low et al, 200 1). 
An example of a complex system that is widely cited is a forest (e.g., O'Neill et al 
(1986; Pahl-Wostl, 1995). For simplicity, the system here is viewed as being composed of 
an assemblage of trees, which are composed of their individual parts (e.g., leaves). 
Individual tree leaves respond rapidly to momentary changes in light intensity. The leaves 
respond by either increasing or decreasing photosynthesis. However, the growth of a tree 
responds more slowly to these short-term changes. Additionally, the species composition 
of the forest changes even more slowly, on the time scale of decades or centuries. Therefore, 
processes occurring lower in the system (i.e., the reaction of the tree leaves to changes in 
light intensity) are rapid in comparison to the processes that occur higher in the system and 
do not have as large an impact on the system. The reactions that occur within a single leaf 
will not drastically alter the entire forest. The processes occurring higher in the hierarchy 
(e.g., tree growth) occur very slowly and have large impacts on the system. Despite the 
rapid processes that occur at the lower levels, the forest generally appears stable. This is 
because the processes occurring at the lower levels are averaged or smoothed as they 
"move" up the hierarchy. That is, the higher levels constrain the fast dynamics that occur 
at the lower levels. The processes occurring at that level result in emergent properties of the 
tree that we see at a higher level (e.g., leaf color). When we view the forest from the scale of 
an individual tree, we can essentially ignore what happens at the level of the individual leaf 
(e.g., how the leaf responds to changes in light). It is not necessary for us to know exactly 
the processes that occur at the level of the individual leaf to know whether the tree is healthy. 
By losing the detail that occurs at the scale of the individual tree leaf, we simplify what is 
otherwise a very complex system. 
The hierarchy can also be viewed as a series of constraints that act on the rates of 
processes in the system, which exist at multiple scales (O'Neill et al. 1986; Apollonio, 
1994). A constraint is something that functions to slow down system dynamics, increase 
relative stability and predictability, and integrate system components (O'Neill et al, 1986). 
The higher constraints are characterized by slow dynamics and cover a broad spatial area. 
The lower constraints are characterized by fast dynamics and have only a limited impact on 
the system. In the example above, the growth rate of the tree limits the rapid dynamics of 
the processes occurring within an individual leaf. Therefore, the higher levels are 
considered to be constraining the lower levels. The processes occurring at the lower levels 
result in emergent properties, which are only viewed at the higher levels in the hierarchy. 
Process rates are averaged as the hierarchy is ascended, and thus, there is a loss of detail at 
the top of the hierarchy. In other words, the effects of events occurring at lower levels in the 
system are diminished by the time they make their way to the system level. The result is that 
the dynamics at the system level are generally more stable. Although the composition of 
components within a system may change, the system level is considered stable as it is 
characterized by familiar and recurrent patterns. Consequently, there is more yalitzttive 
predictability at the system level than at the subsystem level. 
Feedback Problems 
Another important property of complex systems is imperfect feedback. There are 
essentially two causes of imperfect feedback. One source of imperfect feedback arises with 
the connections that exist between subsystems, which make them nearly decomposable as 
opposed to completely decomposable. These connections create leaks through which 
feedback is lost.' If there were no leaks, all feedback could be captured locally. Strong, 
non-linear interactions between components present additional problems for those seeking 
feedback from complex systems. Therefore, even if feedback is captured, it will not be 
captured entirely and it will be ambiguous. Ambiguous feedback hinders our ability to 
understand the behavior of the system. Both feedback problems pose difficulties as we try 
to learn about and understand complex adaptive systems. 
Marine Ecosystems as Complex Systems 
It is well known that marine systems are complex. The following section attempts to 
provide a hypothetical hierarchical description of these complex ecosystems. Here marine 
systems are described as spatially organized hierarchies, where marine systems are 
composed of spatially discrete, but not completely independent subsystems layered in a 
hierar~hy.~ 
At the level that is referred to as the subsystem level in the hierarchy there are 
patchily distributed resources, which are similarly repeated at other locations at the same 
scale. The distribution of these resources results from oceanographic processes (e.g., 
currents, gyres), as well as geological and bathymetric features in the system. Boundaries 
of the next higher level are defined by where the rate of interactions between subsystems 
declines. In other words, unique processes that occur at different rates distinguish each 
level in the hierarchy. As one moves from the system to subsystem level or from the top to 
the bottom of the hierarchy, process rates increase and dynamics become more variable. 
However, feedback lost through these leaks is manifest at the next level in the system and theoretically 
could still be captured. 
The description below is only one of the many possible ways to organize the structure and behavior of 
marine systems using hierarchy theory. For example, one could also organize the system according to 
trophic levels. 
One could imagine the hierarchy as extending down to infinitely small  scale^.^ 
However, for conceptual purposes, the smallest subsystem considered here is the scale 
compatible with what ecologists think of as ecosystems (i.e., self-organized ecological 
systems), but with migration occumng between areas. These ecosystems are composed of 
interacting abiotic and biotic elements (sensu Whittiker, 1972). Such ecosystems may be 
described in terms of energy flow, trophic levels, species interactions, functional groups, 
redundancy, stability, resilience, and assembly rules (e.g., Holling, 1973; Paine, 1980; 
Walker, 1992; Weiher and Keddy, 1995; Larkin, 1996; Naeem, 1998; Steneck, 2001). 
In many ways, the subsystems described here are compatible with the spatially 
distributed patches that comprise metapop~lations.~ Metapopulation theory has a long 
history, but has only recently begun to make its way into the population biology and 
conservation literature (Hanksi and Simberloff, 1997). The term metapopulation, first 
introduced by Richard Levins in 1969, was used to describe a set of spatially discrete 
groups of individuals (Wells and Richmond, 1995). Weins (1997) summarizes the basic 
tenets of metapopulation theory below. 
[A] metapopulation is spatially subdivided into a series of local (patch) 
populations. The classical view emphasizes a balance between 
extinctions and recolonizations that facilitates long-term persistence 
of the metapopulation.. .The dynamics of local populations are 
density-dependent within patches but asynchronous among patches, 
and migration (dispersal) among patches links them together. 
However, unlike traditional metapopulation theory, this paper is principally 
concerned with the problem of obtaining feedback from disturbance (i.e., the harvesting of) 
multi-species assemblages. The patches (i.e., subsystems), therefore, are viewed as 
comprising metacomm~nities.~ Metacommunities can be defined as "a set of local 
communities in different locations, coupled by dispersal of one or more of their constituent 
' For example, another level below the subsystem level is the population (or functional group) level, which 
is composed of individuals. Individuals are also made up of subsystems (e.g., organs). As is clear, one could 
infinitely continue to dissect the system. 
Metapopulations can be defined as "a set of local populations coupled by dispersal" (Hanski, 1990). 
members" (Holt, 1997,150). A patch is defined as "a continuous area of space with all 
necessary resources for the persistence of a local population and separated by unsuitable 
habitat from other patches" (Hanski and Simberloff, 1997). 
System Dynamics 
As noted, the subsystems (i.e., ecosystems) can be viewed as self-organized 
communities (or metacommunities) composed of species and their habitats (e.g., substrate). 
Dynamics within a subsystem are highly variable and unpredictable. However, the 
interactions between species and between species and their environments result in emergent 
properties of the subsystem such as stability and resilience. 
For instance, two important interactions that occur within a subsystem are predation 
and competition (e.g., for food and/or space). In a food or energy limited system, a 
population will either increase or decrease depending on predator and/or competitor 
abundance and food availabi~ity.'~ That is, when a species' competitors and/or predators 
decline, one would expect its population to increase to take up the newly available energy (or 
food/space) that now exists (e.g., release from predation or competitive release).' ' As noted 
by Levin (1 999, 169), "Though individual species may fluctuate more when they are mixed 
with other species, the total biomass of all species may be expected to fluctuate less because 
some species will be at their peaks while others are at their lows. Individual species take up 
the slack for each other, owing in part to independent statistical fluctuation, and no doubt in 
part to reduced competitive pressures." In other words, although the species composition of 
in the subsystem is likely to change, the subsystem system as a whole will continue to be 
relatively stable and show typically recognizable patterns. 
Metacommunities do not go extinct, but merely change in species composition. 
'O Ignoring such things as environmental influences, fishing, etc. 
" We refer to the replacement in the system of one population by another as compensation. By 
replacement, we do not mean that the species is absent from the system, but its influence in the system (in 
ternls of energy consumption) has declined. The compensating species is viewed as simply taking up the 
newly available energy (or space) in the system. 
Although each subsystem may contain the same or a similar assemblage of species, 
the species in many ways can be considered local to the subsystem to which they belong.I2 
The species in each subsystem are less influenced by conditions existing at other 
subsystems, but are similarly influenced by events occurring at a larger scale in the system 
(e.g., large-scale phenomenon such as climate change). For example, if a disturbance 
occurs at one subsystem, fish of the same species residing in another subsystem may not be 
affected at all, except through effects emanating from the larger system. These properties are 
consistent with metapopulation (or metacommunity) theory. 
The species found within a subsystem fulfill various functions in the subsystem and 
typically occupy overlapping niches. It is convenient to organize the species within a 
subsystem according to functional grouping (Steneck and Dethier, 1994; Steneck, 2001). 
Redundancy within functional groups may be a prerequisite for stable subsystem dynamics 
(Stone, 1995; Naeem, 1997; Peterson et al., 1998; Steneck, 2001 ; Jackson et. al, 2001). For 
example, if a species in one functional group is removed from the system, another species in 
that same functional group can move in and take its place. This suggests that conservation 
should try to maintain the integrity of functional group diversity within an ecosystem. 
Hypothetical Hierarchy for the Gulf of Maine 
This section attempts to describe the Gulf of Maine region as a hierarchically 
organized complex system. 
At the top of the hierarchy, there are large marine ecosystems. Sherman and 
Alexander (1986) describe large marine ecosystems as being characterized by distinct 
hydrographic regimes, submarine topography, productivity, and trophically dependent 
l 2  One exception to this, however, is migration, which represents one leak through which feedback is lost. 
The migrating species represent links (or flows) between subsystems. 
populations. These systems are generally greater than 200,000 km. An example of a large 
marine ecosystem provided by Sherman (1991) is the U.S. Northeast Continental Shelf. l 3  
Sissenwine (1986) describes this large ecosystem as being composed of two 
systems - the Gulf of Maine and Georges ~ a n k . ' ~  However, the boundary between these 
systems is not perfect. The Georges Bank system is connected to the Gulf of Maine and 
other regions via water movement, larval drift, and fish migration. Water circulation patterns 
in the Gulf of Maine and on Georges Bank involve seasonally variable gyres (Baukus, 
1987; Townsend, 1989; Sissenwine, 1984). The gyre in the Gulf of Maine is cyclonic 
(counterclockwise), while the gyre operating on Georges Bank is anticyclonic (clockwise). 
The gyre in the Gulf of Maine breaks down in the fall and winter and water is allowed to 
drift onto Georges Bank. This movement of water from the Gulf of Maine onto Georges 
Bank represents a linkage between these two systems. Similarly, the western side of the 
gyre on Georges Bank breaks down and water is allowed to drift to the Mid-Atlantic area. 
Therefore, although these are not closed systems, the Gulf of Maine and Georges Bank can 
be considered two components of a single large system (e.g., Fogarty and Murawski, 1998.) 
It is possible to consider these two systems as being composed of subsystems (or 
metacommunities). One can imagine these subsystems as being nearly decomposable and 
patchily distributed. However, it is difficult to envision exact boundaries of subsystems 
within the Gulf of Maine or within Georges Bank. One problem is that the scientific 
agenda established for managing fisheries has not been focused on this scale of the system 
(Wilson, 2001). Consequently, much of the oceanographic work that has been done in this 
region has occurred at a larger scale than the "subsystem" level." However, it is still 
l 3  Two other examples of large marine ecosystems given by Shem~an (1991) are the Gulf of Mexico and the 
North Sea. 
l4 However, considering the biogeographic and oceanographic characteristics of the Northeast Continental 
Shelf, this description is somewhat misleading. Georges Bank is clearly separated from the shelf by the 
Great South Channel. 
l5 Despite the difficulty involved in trying to identify the most appropriate boundaries of these subsystems, 
there is evidence that processes occurring at this local scale are important and management should not 
ignore this level of the system (Ames, 1996; Hunt von Herbing, et al, 1997). 
possible to envision subsystems within these areas. For example, in the Gulf of Maine 
these subsystems could be as small as or smaller than Penobscot Bay or as large or larger 
than the Bay of Fundy. More work will need to be done before suitable boundaries of these 
ecosystems can be described.I6 
Ideally, the boundaries should be designed to allow scientists and managers the 
ability to capture the most appropriate feedback from the system (Wilson, 2001). It is 
possible that sufficient feedback may be gained by focusing management at the scale of 
what here is described above as a system.'' In addition, it is likely that future boundaries 
established for management purposes will ultimately be determined on the basis of both 
ecological and social criteria. For example, if the U.S. chooses to manage Georges Bank as 
a separate system from the Gulf of Maine, it will in reality only be managing part of the 
bank since the Northeast Peak belongs to Canada. 
As noted above, the subsystems (i.e., ecosystems) within these systems (i.e., 
Georges Bank and the Gulf of Maine) can be viewed as metacornmunities composed of 
species and their habitats (e.g., substrate).'' Each subsystem is likely to contain the same or 
a similar assemblage of species. However, the species in many ways can be considered local 
to the subsystem to which they belong. The dynamics that occur within a subsystem (e.g., 
recruitment in individual populations) are highly variable and unpredictable. However, the 
interactions between species and between species and their environments should result in 
emergent properties of the subsystem (such as pattern stability19). 
l6 Since there are really no absolute boundaries in the ocean and the concept of boundaries is mainly 
dependent on how the system is viewed andlor the scientific questions being asked, it is in reality 
impossible to define exact boundaries in the ocean. 
" That is, sufficient feedback may be captured by managing the Gulf of Maine and Georges Bank 
separately. Even if in actuality more feedback could be gained by focusing lower in the system, it is a good 
place to begin a transition towards an ecosystem approach to management. 
However, there is conflicting evidence that makes it difficult for us to know whether these populations 
are discrete or metapopulations. 
Does the Gulf of Maine Really fit the Descrivtion of a CAS? 
The Gulf of Maine region, unlike the generic complex marine system described 
previously is characterized by little diversity (including low functional diversity) 
(Anonymous, 2000). There are also few species left in this system that interact strongly 
(Anonymous, 2000).20 This suggests that the system is less stable and predictable than 
systems with high diversity and functional redundancy. This does not mean, however, that 
the theory described here cannot be applied to this region. 
In fact, the Gulf of Maine region may exemplify what happens when the hierarchic 
structure of complex marine systems is degraded. Prior to the advent of otter trawling and 
the commercialization of fishing, there was an abundance of cod, "haddock", and other 
predatory finfish in the system. These predators dominated the system despite hook and 
line fishing for at least 5,000 years (Steneck, 1997). However, beginning in the early part of 
the 20" century, with the advent of the otter trawl and the commercialization of fisheries, 
exploitation of these top predators intensified. Today, these species are now considered to 
be ecologically extinct from the region (Steneck, 1997, Steneck, 2001, Jackson et al, 2001). 
The system is now largely dominated by commercially less important species (e.g., sculpins, 
dogfish, skates) and several invertebrate species (e.g., lobster, crabs, urchins) have also 
- 
increased in abundance (Steneck, 1997). Harvesting methods (e.g., trawling) have also 
contributed to the alteration of the system by reducing the structural complexity of habitats 
(Watling and Norse1998; Fogarty and Murawski, 1998). Despite management efforts to 
reduce harvesting pressures (e.g., groundfish closures), the once abundant predatory 
groundfish populations remain noticeably reduced in the system (Ames, 1997; Murawski et. 
al, 2000). 
l9 Here stability does not mean individual populations at or near equilibrium, but refers to the tendency of 
the system to vary within a range and to show typically recognizable patterns. 
This could suggest that compensation between species may not occur, and so the total system biomass 
may be variable instead of remaining relatively stable. However, even if species do not interact strongly, 
they do interact in the sense that they compete for available energy, which is limited. 
According to the systems perspective described above, it appears that, as a result of 
harvesting activities, important constraints in the system (e.g., trophic structure, habitat, 
spatial distributions) have been removed and the system is more variable than it might be 
otherwise. That is, the hierarchic organization has been compromised and this complex 
system may no longer be as stable as it may have once been. Wilson (2001) suggests that 
maintaining the integrity of the "long time step variables" (e.g., habitat, climate, stock 
structure, spatial distributions) increases the likelihood of observing similar configurations 
in the system, which makes the system more stable than it might be otherwise. It is possible 
that if we restore these system variables, then the system may begin to resemble a more 
typical complex system (i.e., one characterized by stable patterns) similar to the one that 
existed prior to extensive exploitation by humans. 
In summary, marine systems, such as the Gulf of Maine region, can be described as 
hierarchically organized complex systems with properties common to other complex 
systems. Processes that occur at the top of the hierarchy are slower, but impact a large 
spatial area. Processes occurring at the bottom are fast and only influence a small spatial 
area. Also, the subsystems and the species comprising the subsystems are constrained by 
processes occurring at higher levels (e.g., at the system level). The system is not greatly 
influenced by what happens at the subsystem level. Also, rates are averaged as the hierarchy 
is ascended, so the system level is more stable and predictable than the subsystem level. 
Similarly, events occurring at the subsystem level are more stable and predictable than what 
happens within the subsystem. For example, although the biomass of individual species 
may be highly variable, the average biomass of the subsystem remains relatively stable (e.g., 
May et. al, 1979; Laevastu and Hayes, 1981, Murawski and Idoine, 1992; Fogarty and 
Murawski, 1998; Levin, 1999). 
Management Difficulties Posed by Imperfect Feedback 
Describing marine systems in terms of hierarchy theory has several implications for 
managing fisheries. For successful management systems to evolve, we need to learn what 
does and does not work. In order to for us to learn in complex systems, it is essential that 
we have feedback from the system (Holland, 1998; Ulanowicz, 1997, Wilson, 2001). 
Otherwise, we have no idea what rules work best. Furthermore, we have no way of learning 
how to make existing rules more meaningful. Unfortunately, the highly variable nature of 
the system makes it very difficult for us to capture, understand, and respond to feedback in 
the system. 
Capturing Feedback 
Feedback from the system is difficult to capture. Some feedback will inevitably be 
lost between the flows that connect the subsystems. For example, some feedback will be 
lost from an area because of larval drift and migration. In addition, given our human 
(imperfect) measurement abilities, we are likely to miss some of the feedback that results 
from our actions. As we try to capture feedback from the system, we need to have some 
idea what it is that we need to measure and how to measure it. If we do not measure the 
"right" things, then we may miss some important feedback. Then at some point we must 
analyze and interpret the data and observations that we have made, which then must be 
communicated to decision-makers. These processes take time. By the time the feedback is 
analyzed and in the hands of the decision-makers (i.e., captured), it is likely that the system 
has changed. 
Ambiguous Feedback 
Another problem exists - ambiguous feedback, which results from the non-linear 
nature of the system. Ambiguity poses a more serious problem for resource managers 
because even if feedback can be captured, we may not know what the feedback means or 
how to respond to it. Additionally, even when a rule appears to work well, it cannot be 
assured that the rule will continue to have similarly favorable outcomes in the future. There 
is simply always going to be a lot of uncertainty regarding the results of our actions 
(Wilson, 2001). Given this, it goes without saying that we should try to adopt the most 
precautionary and conservative policies - assuming that we know what they are. 
In addition, as suggested earlier, the uncertainty created by ambiguous feedback 
makes it difficult for users to develop conservation incentives. For example, a user only has 
an incentive to restrain hisher activities today if they believe they will receive some benefits 
of that restraint in the future. With the kind of uncertainty that exits in marine systems, 
users cannot be assured that they will benefit for any conservation efforts that they make. 
Similarly, the flows responsible for imperfect feedback discourage users from adopting 
stewardship roles. This is because the boundaries of the resource (subsystems) are 
permeable, and users are less likely to capture all of the benefits provided by their 
conservation efforts. Institutions can be designed to create assurances for users that 
encourage them to conserve the resource despite the uncertainties that discourage them 
(Wilson, 2001). In addition, Wilson suggests that assigning broad rights will likely create 
an environment where users have incentives to invest in the future, and thus adopt 
conservation practices. 
Responding to Feedback 
Assuming that feedback can be captured and understood, decision-makers must also 
be able to respond to the feedback. For example, feedback from the system may indicate 
that one species is doing poorly and that users need to remove effort from that fishery and 
switch either to a new location or to another fishery. It may be difficult for the user to adjust 
if they need to switch fisheries. For example, it may be necessary for the user to re-rig their 
vessel with another gear type in order to target a different species, which may be costly in 
terms of both time and money. Switching fisheries may be prevented because of certain 
license requirements. Legal boundaries may prevent the user from fishing for the same 
species in a different area. Or, small vessels may not be equipped to travel long distances to 
other fishing locations. 
Additionally, if fishing experience indicates a need for a new rule, coming to an 
agreement will likely take some time and negotiation. If a new rule is agreed upon, it must 
be implemented which may involve long legal processes (e.g., through legislatures). Then 
users must be informed and change their strategies to conform to the new rule. Local level 
institutions are more likely to be capable of responding to changes in feedback than are 
regional institutions because local level institutions are generally smaller and more 
adaptable. 
Another problem in responding to feedback involves how to interpret it. Analytical 
errors can hinder our ability to respond appropriately to feedback. When interpreting 
feedback, decision-makers use some form of model to determine what the feedback means 
and what should be done. If, for example, feedback is analyzed with an imperfect model (or 
with a flawed understanding of the system) the response may actually result in harm to the 
resource. Additionally, we may know what kind of response is appropriate, but we may not 
know how much response is adequate. For example, we may receive feedback that tells us 
that there is an abundance of a particular species and we determine that the appropriate 
response is to switch effort towards that species. In other words, it is possible for us to over 
and under respond to feedback and we may never be able to know exactly how much effort 
is appropriate. 
Ln general, the problems we face in trying to respond to feedback are due to the 
highly variable and complex nature of the system. When everything is changing rapidly, it is 
difficult for us to know how to respond appropriately and quickly enough. If we hope to 
sustain fishery resources, it is important that we organize the structure of fishing rights so 
that we can maximize our abilities to capture and react appropriately to feedback from the 
subsystems. 
The Organization of Fishing 
Traditionally, fishermen have adjusted to the variability in the system by utilizing 
one of two fishing strategies. One strategy is for a vessel to target a single species across 
multiple ecosystems. With the second strategy, fishermen target multiple species in a 
relatively small geographic area. Considering these two strategies, there are two licensing 
options available for managers. The first approach, based on conventional single species 
economic theory, is to allocate rights to single species across systems (i.e., the Little Box 
approach to management). The second is to allocate rights to multiple species within a well- 
defined area (i.e., the Big Box approach to management). These two ways to organize 
fishing can be easily described in the context of hierarchy theory. 
If there were no flows at all, when subsystems are perfectly decomposable, all 
feedback can be captured within the subsystem. In this case, it makes sense to apply rules 
at this scale. Still, if we assume linkages between subsystems are only minimal, more 
feedback can be captured locally within the subsystem level than between subsystems. This 
is because the intensity of interactions is greater within than between subsystems. Further, 
even when flows are more than minimal, feedback loops are generally tighter at the local or 
subsystem level than at the regional or system level and feedback is quicker at the local level 
than the regional level (Levin, 1999). 
This strongly implies that we may not get enough feedback when rules are focused 
solely on individual species at the system (regional) level, such as with the conventional, 
Little Box approach. The problem with focusing on individual species is that dynamics at 
this scale are too variable and unpredictable, which makes feedback "noisy". The problem 
with focusing solely at the regional level is that feedback is dissipated as it makes it way up 
from the subsystem level to the system level, and consequently our ability to understand it is 
diminished. Since more feedback can be captured at the subsystem level, the implication is 
that we need to find an alternative to the large scale single species approach to management, 
where harvesting rights are assigned to individual species and those species are managed 
independently. 
With this in mind, an attractive alternative approach is to adopt what users refer to as 
a Big Box approach to management, where harvesting rights are allocated to multiple 
species within a defined management area (which should correspond roughly with 
subsystem boundaries). This approach is explored in the next chapter using an age 
structured, multi-species bioeconornic model. Additionally, hierarchy theory suggests we 
design institutions to parallel the multi-scale hierarchical structure of the marine system 
(Wilson, 2001; Wilson, 1996). Each level in such a "parallel management structure" would 
aim to capture feedback at a specific scale in the system. A "parallel management 
structure" would be complimentary to a Big Box approach to management. In addition to 
allowing us to capture the most feedback possible (i.e., from all scales in the system), this 
approach would also enable us to capture the feedback that is lost through leaks between 
levels (e.g., through migration). 
Summary Chapter 1 
The complex nature of the marine environment has made it very difficult for us to 
manage the world's fisheries. We have to simplify the system, but hierarchy theory 
suggests that the single species approach of conventional fisheries theory and practice may 
be the wrong way. The result has been a nearly universal failure to protect the marine 
environment and its resources. For successful management systems to evolve, we need to 
learn what kinds of rules will result in sustainable resource use. This requires that we 
receive feedback from the system. Complexity and hierarchy theory suggest that more 
feedback can be captured by paying attention to subsystems rather than single species. This 
is because there is generally more stability and predictability at the subsystem level than at 
the species level in the system. Additionally, the interactions that occur within the 
subsystem are tighter and quicker than the interactions that occur across subsystems. By 
managing the system at the species level, it is unlikely that we can capture the kind of 
feedback that we need. Therefore, in order to capture the most feedback from the system, 
we need to move away from the purely large scale, single species approach to fisheries 
management. New institutions are needed if we are to incorporate the complex behavior of 
the system into fisheries management policies. These institutions need to parallel the multi- 
scale hierarchical structure of marine ecosystems and provide incentives for users to invest 
in an uncertain future. Unfortunately, feedback in highly variable complex systems is 
imperfect and ambiguous. New alternatives need to be explored as we learn how to capture, 
understand, and respond to feedback from the system. 
CHAPTER 2: 
EXPLORING IMPERFECT FEEDBACK UNDER TWO HARVESTING 
MANAGEMENT REGIMES USING TWO AGE-STRUCTURED, 
MULTISPECIES BIOECONOMIC MODELS 
Introduction 
As described in Chapter 1, marine ecosystems are highly variable, non-linear 
systems characterized by complexity (e.g., Levin, 1999). This complexity creates many 
problems for those seeking to manage marine resources (Ludwig et al, 1993; Dayton, 
1998). Possibly the most important difficulty arises from the numerous levels of 
uncertainty and predictability that exist in fisheries, both political and biological. This 
uncertainty (I) makes it nearly impossible for decision-makers to learn how to make 
meaningful management decisions (i.e., how to know if rules will result in sustainable 
resource use) and (2) can create barriers against the development of conservation or 
stewardship ethics (Wilson, 2001). In order to learn and minimize uncertainty in complex 
marine systems, we must rely on feedback from the system (Holland, 1998; Ulanowicz, 
1999; Wilson, 2001). Unfortunately, feedback in highly variable, non-linear complex 
systems can be imperfect and ambiguous. Furthermore, even if feedback can be captured 
and is understood, managers and users must be able to respond in a way that furthers their 
objectives. Thus, understanding feedback in marine systems is essential if we are to create 
sustainable management systems. 
Two Perspectives for Dealing with System Variability 
In complex marine systems, successful fishermen must know how and be able to 
adapt to changes in the system (i.e., system variability). In order to deal with the variability 
that exists in the system fishermen have generally utilized one of two fishing strategies. One 
strategy is for a vessel to target a single species across multiple ecosystems. With the 
second strategy, fishermen target multiple species in a relatively small geographic area. 
A notable example of the first strategy is the U.S. redfish fishery that existed until 
the 1980s (Arnes, pers. communication). These large vessels traveled from the Gulf of 
Maine as far as Labrador, targeting local stocks of redfish. These vessels were able to react 
to the variability of redfish in any particular area by always moving to areas of greater 
abundance. That is, they relied on the stability in the average redfish biomass across 
systems (in one area redfish biomass may be low, in another area redfish biomass may be 
high - so the average is relatively stable). The Soviet fleets pursued a similar strategy on a 
much larger scale. Because small boats cannot travel long distances, this strategy is more 
suitable for large vessels. Additionally, this strategy is more economically feasible for large 
vessels because they do not have to switch between multiple gear types. The forgone 
fishing cost when the boat is in the yard is especially costly to large vessels, which is why 
they prefer to target a single species or species complex. 
An example of the second strategy is the traditional Maine inshore multi-species 
fishing operation. These small vessels typically would target lobster in the spring and early 
summer, groundfish in the summer, shrimp and scallop in the winter (Acheson, 1988). In 
fact, inshore, small boat fishermen everywhere are known for switching from fishery to 
fishery (or from species to species) as needed. Switching between fisheries allows them to 
take advantage of market trends and changes in species abundance (Acheson, 1988). In 
other words, this strategy deals with system variability by relying on the stability that arises 
within the system. That is, although individual species populations may change from year to 
year, there is always something in the system for these fishermen to harvest These small 
boats are generally not able to move across multiple subsystems to chase individual species. 
Only large vessels are capable of this migration. Additionally, switching between multiple 
gear types is less costly for small boat operators because it can be done quicker. Therefore, 
small boat fishermen generally prefer switching from fishery to fishery (or species to 
species). 
These two short-term strategies for dealing with system variability represent two 
licensing options for managers and suggest two ways that we may be able to capture and 
respond to feedback in the system. One approach is to allocate harvesting rights to a single 
species throughout its range. This approach, known as the Little Box approach, is most 
suitable for large vessels that are able to fish across multiple ecosystems. The second 
option, known as the Big Box approach, is to allocate rights to multiple species within a 
defined management area. This approach is more suitable for small vessels that must 
remain in a relatively small geographic area. The recent trend in fisheries management, 
which relies on conventional single species fisheries economics, has been towards the Little 
Box approach to management. 
Conventional, Single-Species, Little Box Perspective 
The conventional perspective, which implies Little Box management, attempts to 
capture feedback from the marine environment by focusing on individual species in 
isolation. Because species-specific rights are allocated to users across systems and 
subsystems and rules typically cover the entire range of a particular stock, local conditions 
and processes (e.g., habitat, local stock structure, fish behavior) are essentially ignored. 
The conventional perspective conceives the problem in a way that assumes that we 
simply need to estimate the current size of the adult population in order to get sufficient 
feedback from the system. This perspective assumes a simple balance between the growth 
of the population (e.g., births and growth) and mortality (including fishing m~r t a l i t~ ) .~ '  
This model (e.g., the Schaeffer model, Ricker model, and Beverton/Holt model) finds that 
recruitment to the population is governed by the adult size of the population (e.g., spawning 
stock biomass) and that the population will grow until it reaches its maximum size, which 
assumes that there is an attainable equilibrium determined by a carrying capacity (Fig 1). 
The variability that occurs in the population is considered to be due to changes in the adult 
population and environmental "noise". Along these lines, the theory suggests that we can 
get feedback by monitoring changes in the adult population (i.e., recruitment). It assumes 
we can learn from this feedback and, by changing mortality due to fishing, can exercise 
control over the population. Basically we can either increase or decrease fishing effort 
(which will either increase or decrease the size of the population) and will know how the 
population will respond (i.e., in terms of future recruitment). 
Figure 1: Theoretical Stock-Recruitment Relationship 
Recruitment 
Spawning Stock Biomass 
Fisheries economics recognizes the need for some sort of resource control or 
property rights. In the absence of property rights, a situation referred to as open access, 
feedback and learning do not take place. Consequently, profits are not maximized and the 
resource is overexploited, a situation known as "the Tragedy of the Commons" (Hardin, 
1968). This is due to the lack of individual incentives that encourage users to conserve the 
resource. With no property rights, under open access fishing, users cannot be assured that 
they will benefit in the future for any conservation efforts that they make today. With little 
-- - 
2' Anderson (1986) provides a complete description of the conventional economic theory of fisheries 
stake in the future of the resource, there is little incentive to learn, and so users to do not pay 
attention to feedback in the system. Consequently, fisheries management seeks to create a 
sole owner, which through exclusion, will bear all of the costs and enjoy all of the benefits 
of the future condition of the resource. Loosely defined, the sole owner can take the form 
of a collective body such as the government, a corporation, a co-op, or a community. A sole 
owner is a theoretical construct that represents a single decision maker who is given all 
rights to the resource. The sole owner bears all of the costs and enjoys all of the benefits of 
conservation, and thus, has an incentive to learn how to harvest the resource in the most 
sustainable manner in its efforts to maximize profits. Thus, the sole owner will be more 
likely to pay attention to feedback in the system. 
Based on the ecological assumptions described above (i.e., stock-recruitment 
relationships), conventional economic theory utilizes effort-yield curves to describe the 
amount of fish that the sole owner can take and still allow the stock to sustain its population 
level. While biologists describe the largest amount that can be taken that will achieve 
sustainability as the population's maximum sustainable yield (MSY), economists refer to 
the greatest value fish that can be taken as the maximum economic yield (MEY). MEY is 
the amount that a theoretical sole owner would remove from the system in order to 
maximize profits and occurs at a population level higher and catch level lower than MSY. 
With one decision-maker controlling the amount of effort in the fishery (i.e., the sole 
owner), the feedback problem is greatly simplified. Theoretically, the sole-owner should 
know exactly how much effort it is using and can more quickly change its effort levels 
according to changes in stock size. 
There are many important assumptions underlying this perspective that may over 
simplify feedback problem in marine systems. First of all, this theory assumes that we can 
capture perfect, or at least very good, feedback from the system by simply looking at 
changes in the size of the adult population relative to fishing. It assumes that we know what 
- - - 
management. 
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the feedback means (i.e., that it is not ambiguous). With this theory, we know that in a 
population of X size, recruitment will be Y. Thirdly, it assumes that we can respond 
appropriately to the feedback by simply changing levels of fishing effort. This perspective 
requires that we know what impact we are having on the system (i.e., what our effort levels 
are and what they mean) and requires that we can accurately estimate population sizes. 
In reality, however, marine systems are complex and feedback is difficult to capture, 
ambiguous, and difficult to respond to. Although examples do exist where fish populations 
have recovered after the cessation of fishing (e.g., the recovery of fish stocks during world 
wars), there have also been instances where the result was not as the conventional, single- 
species theory would have predicted. Mike Sinclair, a scientist at the Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans in Canada, recently described the concern over unexpected increases 
in young cod death rates that have occurred since a moratorium was imposed on the species 
in the early 1990s .~~  Considering the single species models and a 10-year suspension of 
harvesting activities, one would expect that the cod resource would have recovered by now. 
However, this has not been the case. Another notable example occurred in New England. 
When spawning area closures were implemented to protect the groundfish resource on 
Georges Bank in 1994, the expectation was that the groundfish stocks would recover with 
the removal of fishing pressures. However, 5 years after these areas were closed to fishing, 
the result was not the recovery of the groundfish populations, but a booming scallop 
population (Murawski et. al, 2000). A third example is illustrated by the loss of the inshore 
cod and haddock stocks in the Gulf of Maine (Arnes, 1997). Although, harvesting pressures 
were removed on the inshore stocks in the 1960s, the stocks have not since recovered. 
These examples illustrate the complicated causality in complex marine systems and the high 
probability that simply changing levels of fishing effort cannot achieve sustainability. 
This raises an important question: If the source of variability in fish populations is 
not due solely to changes in the size of the adult populations, then does the conventional 
22 Auld, A. December 22,2000. Bangor Daily News. A7. 
single-species approach oversimplify the feedback problem? Put another way, if stock- 
recruitment relationships do not exist, can we get sufficient feedback from the system by 
looking solely at individual species across systems (i.e., using a Little Box approach to 
management)? Or, is it necessary to take some form of non-species specific approach to 
management? 
An Ecosystem Perspec the 
An alternative view, which implies a Big Box management approach, considers the 
system as being composed of patchily distributed subsystems and as having both spatial 
and temporal heterogeneity. This perspective assumes a hierarchically organized complex 
system, as described by Simon (1962) and O'Neill et al. (1986).~~ This view recognizes the 
importance of the interactions that occur between species and between species and their 
environments. Furthermore, this view assumes a non-equilibrium based, dynamic system 
characterized by high levels of variability and non-linearity. 
Nevertheless, there is an important form of stability found in these systems. 
Multiple subsystems create redundancy, which provide resilience for the system and for the 
species that occupy the system (Simon, 1962; Levin, 1999). This redundancy makes marine 
systems relatively resilient to perturbations  disturbance^).'^ For example, if one area 
experiences a disturbance (e.g., from a storm) that results in zero settlement of one species, 
then it is possible that individuals of that same species from an adjacent area will be able to 
re-colonize that area (Holling, 1973). This is consistent with metapopulation theory (e.g., 
Hanski and Gilpin, 1997). In addition, another type of redundancy, resulting from species 
diversity within functional groups, may also result in subsystem stability (e.g., Peterson et 
al, 1998; Jackson et al, 2001). With the loss of one species there is likely another within that 
functional group in that subsystem that performs the same, or nearly the same, function 
(allowing the system or subsystem as a whole to function as always (e.g., Steneck, 2001). 
l3 See also Chapter 1. 
Additionally, interactions among the components (i.e., species) of the subsystem provide 
stability through post-settlement (pre-recruitment) regulation. The most significant of these 
interactions occur during species early life stages2' 
Compensation among species is another strong attribute of these systems. The fact 
that systems are food or energy limited suggests that when the population of one species 
increases, another species' population must decline since energy will not exist to completely 
support it. This is due to niche overlap. That is, with the removal of even one individual, 
there is "room" in the system for another. Similarly, when one species is reduced or 
removed, another may be able to take its place. How a species reacts to changes in the 
system is a function of their intrinsic characteristics (e.g., fast growing and short lived or 
slow growing and long lived). We use the word compensation to refer to the growth of a 
population as a result of the decline in another. The result of compensation is that although 
individual species populations are highly variable, there is relative stability of biomass at the 
system level (e.g., Laevastu and Hayes, 1981, Levin, 1999). 
There are several notable examples that illustrate compensation in the Gulf of Maine 
region. It has been suggested that compensation, resulting from community predation, may 
explain the recent growth in the abundance of elasmobranchs (e.g., dogfish and skates) on 
Georges Bank that has occurred since the depletion of the groundfish populations (Fogarty 
and Murawski, 1998). Diet overlap could explain why the elasmobranchs were able to 
increase after the decline in the groundfish populations (i.e., due to a release from 
competition). Similarly, another example often noted is when sand lance populations 
increased dramatically with the decline in herring and mackerel populations in the 1960s 
(Sissenwine, 1984). Populations of herring and mackerel were subsequently able to recover 
to historical levels, perhaps since these species feed on post-larval and juvenile sand lance. 
In coastal regions of the Gulf of Maine, the once abundant large finfish predator species 
24 This does not mean, however, that the system will rebound back to a single equilibrium condition. 
25 One example of such an interaction that occurs at early life stages is predation - or the tendency of big 
fish to eat little fish (Sissenwine (1984). 
(e.g., cod, haddock) are now considered to be ecologically extinct. Consequently, the region 
is now largely dominated by commercially less important species (e.g., sculpins, dogfish, 
skates) and several invertebrate species (e.g., lobster, crabs, urchins) have also increased in 
abundance (Steneck, 1997). 
This perspective attempts to simplify the complexity (and variability) in the system 
by focusing on the stability that arises within the system. That is, this approach assumes that 
the variability of populations is due to what is happening within the system (e-g., with 
interactions between species and their environment), and so does not assume a stock- 
recruitment relationship. Although the various components of the system (e.g., species) 
fluctuate unpredictably, they do so within a general range and the system as a whole is 
generally stable. This approach assumes that most of the feedback from our actions will be 
contained within the system, and so we should look towards the system level as we try to 
capture and respond to feedback. Additionally, it assumes that we can capture more 
feedback by looking at the system level where dynamics are more stable compared to the 
dynamics that occur at the species dimension (where "noise" makes it difficult to perceive 
feedback). 
Summary and Hypothesis 
Thus, there are essentially two different perspectives on how to deal with complexity 
in marine systems. One view, the conventional approach, tries to simplify the system by 
focusing on the individual species populations. A second approach attempts to simplify the 
system by focusing on hierarchical structure and the stability that exists at the system level. 
Each perspective on how to deal with complexity suggests the need for a different approach 
to fisheries management. The first approach implies harvesting rights to species across 
systems (the conventional single species approach, or the "Little Box" approach). The 
second approach implies rights to multiple species within a system (the "Big BOX" 
approach) .26 
It is hypothesized that if there is more stability at the system level (and that 
variability in species populations is due to constraints imposed on the species by system 
factors) compared to the variability and "noise" in the species dimension, then the Big Box 
approach to harvesting will allow for better use of feedback in the system (i.e., that more 
feedback can be captured and harvesters can respond better to that feedback without having 
to deal with as much "noise") compared to the Little Box approach to harvesting. This 
hypothesis will be explored using two age-structured, multi-species bioeconomic models. In 
particular, the models are used to explore the conditions under which appropriate feedback 
can be captured (and responded to) in highly variable complex marine systems. 
Two Bioeconomic Models of A Complex Marine System 
Modeling is a useful tool that allows us to think through what we think we know 
about the system and helps us realize what we do not know. Hannon and Ruth (1997) 
describe the "art of modeling" as an extension of our thinking and as a learning tool. 
Throughout our life we have learned to develop models in our 
minds of the processes that we face everyday. We do solve an 
amazing class of dynamic problems, such as hitting baseballs 
and driving cars, by acquiring through trial and error the skills 
that are necessary to put the various components of a dynamic 
system together in our mind, draw the necessary conclusions, 
and react accordingly. However, the more complex the system, 
the less we are able to sufficiently grasp in our mind its workings 
and to prepare our actions. We simply cannot hold the many aspects 
of a dynamic process in mind at once. We need to be able to capture 
our knowledge, possibly that of others, in a consistent and transparent 
way so that we can better understand, and act in, a changing world. 
26 Sensu Wilson, Brennan, Acheson (1997). 
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Given the complex nature of the marine system, modeling should be viewed as an important 
tool with which to explore the way we conceptualize the system. Further, modeling can yield 
insight into how our actions will influence system dynamics. 
In order to explore the dynamics of a multispecies fishery and the implications of 
the two management approaches previously described, two age-structured, multiple species 
models were created using the graphical programming language STELLA 6.0.27 
These models were designed for the purpose of exploring the ideas previously 
presented. These models were not designed to be predictive and do not exactly replicate 
what happens in the real world (e.g., the Gulf of Maine). That was not the intention. The 
intention was to create tractable models that qualitatively depict the dynamics of a basic 
complex marine system. The purpose was to use the models to explore and extend logically 
our conception of complex marine systems. 
Description of the Models 
Both models are complex and function similarly to ones used by Wilson et al. 
(1991) and Wilson et al. (1999). One model simulates the conventional single species 
approach to management (or the Little Box model) and the other replicates a multispecies 
system approach to management (or the Big Box model). Each model consists of two 
biological sectors, representing two geographically proximate multispecies systems, and an 
economic sector that governs harvesting acti~ities.~' 
Overview of the System 
Both models view the system as complex and dynamic. The two systems are 
considered local but may be connected by larval drift or migration.29 
- 
27 The models were created through a joint effort between Dr. J.A.Wilson, D.F. Gilbert, and the author. 
28 The biological sector was adapted from the FORTRAN Model used by Wilson et. a1 1991. 
29 NO larval drift or migration was included for the purposes of this thesis. 
Two ecological characteristics of the model are important to specify. They are (1) 
the differentiation of the species and (2) a system biomass constraint. The species were 
intentionally differentiated to account for the diversity of species that exist in real world 
systems. Despite this differentiation, the species still occupy overlapping niches. The 
system biomass constraint is included to represent the system's energy budget, or canying 
capacity.30 The system is tight and energy efficient. It is assumed that primary production 
is efficiently converted to fish production and the system is considered to be food limited. 
Two important properties emerge as a result of these characteristics. These 
properties are believed typical of multiple species systems. The first property is relative 
dynamic stability of the overall biomass of the system with highly variable, unpredictable 
component populations (e.g., Simon, 1969; May et. al, 1979; Laevastu and Hayes, 1981, 
Sissenwine 1984; O'Neill, 1986; Murawski and Idoine, 1992; Fogarty and Murawski, 
1998). The second property is compensation (due here to density-dependent non-species 
specific negative feedback at the larval and post-larval stage of the species life) (e.g., 
Sissenwine, 1984; May et. al, 1979; Mayo et. al, 1992; Levin, 1999). 
The Systems 
Each biological sector is similar and contains five age-structured populations. These 
species represent one functional group (or trophic level). These populations have been 
labeled, for convenience only, "herring", "cod", "haddock", "redfish", and "sand 
lance". These species should not be confused with the species found in any real world 
ecosystem. The species were loosely modeled after several species found in the Gulf of 
MaineIGeorges Bank region.31 However, it was necessary to slightly alter some aspects of 
the species life history characteristics in order to differentiate them. Differentiation of the 
species was necessary to represent the diversity of species that exists in real world 
ecosystems. Additionally, without differentiation, the mddel will either not keep each 
For the purposes of this paper, the subsystems in each model are given identical carrying capacities. 
3' Weight at age data were taken from Ruth and Lindholm (1996), Holland (2000), and Northeast Fisheries 
Science Center (1998). 
species extant or depicts the species in synchronous periodicity. Both of these behaviors do 
not realistically reflect real world population dynamics. The species are differentiated on the 
basis of weight-at-age attributes, age of maturity, fecudity, natural mortality, and age of 
recruitment to the fishery. Species longevity is reflected in the natural morality rate, which 
means that species with a higher natural morality rate are shorter-lived species. All species 
were given natural mortality rates from 18% to 25%. Each species enters the fishery at the 
same age that it becomes sexually mature. Additionally, at age 0 and age 1 the mortality of 
each species is differentially influenced by density dependent constraints resulting from the 
system carrying capacity (stated in terms of the biomass of all species). 
As noted, the species were differentiated to appropriately represent the diversity 
found in real world systems. The principle underlying the differentiation used here is that 
species differ in fundamental ways and those differences can be thought of as lying on a 
continua from "r-selected" to "K-selected" life history strategies. Although this concept 
does not account for all aspects of species life history strategies, "it is a useful paradigm of 
the reality of qualitatively different kinds of strategies" (Apollonio, 1994). Species 
exhibiting "r-selected" strategies are characterized as opportunistic while "K-selected" 
species are described as equilibrium or competitor efficient species. Although the species 
are differentiated, it is assumed that there is significant niche overlap. 
The S-pies 
"Sand lance" and "herring" can be considered to lie towards the "r-selected" end 
of the spectrum. These two are the most short-lived of all the species in the model. "Sand 
lance" represents a "bloom" species that is capable of quickly taking advantage of unused 
energy (e.g., food) in the system. "Sand lance" becomes mature at age 2. This species is 
not harvested and represents the untouched biomass that is present in most marine 
ecosystems. Because it is not harvested and is the most fecund of all the species in the 
system, "sand lance" can dominate the system when everything else is heavily fished. This 
allows overfishing with relative biomass stability. "Herring" is also a light, fast growing, 
and relatively fecund species. "Herring" reaches sexual maturity at age three. 
"Cod" and "haddock could be thought as lying somewhere in the middle of the 
continua. "Cod" grows fast and large and is very fecund. It has an intermediate life span, 
compared to the other species. "Haddock" has a shorter life span (higher natural mortality 
rate) and is less fecund than "cod". Both species reach sexual maturity at age 4. 
"Redfish" is characteristic of a "K-selected" species. It is a long-lived 
(experiences relatively low natural mortality) and slow growing species. This species 
reaches maturity later than the other species (age 7) and is assumed to invest more energy 
into ensuring the survival of its young. Therefore, it produces comparatively fewer eggs that 
are less susceptible pre-recruitment mortality. 
Changes in the population size of each species are determined by species specific 
density-dependent egg survival rates, natural mortality, and fishing induced mortality. A 
density-dependent mortality rate controls the number of eggs that survive to age 1 and is a 
function of the total size of the species population. Due to the high levels of interactions 
between these species, the populations are very sensitive to changes in the number of births 
and natural mortality rates. Additionally, the species in the system are also constrained by a 
system carrying capacity. The canying capacity represents the total biomass that the system 
can maintain. As the total biomass of the system nears the carrying capacity, the individual 
species experience additional mortality on age 0 and age 1 classes. Survival of age 1 fish is 
also influenced by an additional density-independent mortality that serves to further 
differentiate the species and allow for compensation. This mortality is randomly generated 
but extends over a wide-range (producing greater variability) for "sand lance" and 
"herring" and less variability for "redfish". 
The Economic Sectors 
The economic sectors of the two models differ substantially. In both models, four of 
the five species in the system are harvested and decisions are made on the basis of 
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profitability. In the first model, the Little Box model, fishing rights are allocated on a single 
species basis. Fishing occurs across the two systems and each boat is restricted to a single 
species. In this model, current profits per boat are compared between systems and a 
proportion of the vessels will migrate towards the most profitable system. In the second 
model, the Big Box model, fishing rights are allocated within one system and vessels are 
allowed to switch between species. In this model, individual vessels compare the relative 
profitability between fishing for the currently targeted species and the profitability of fishing 
for each of the other species, and move to the species where profitability is greater. Two 
ownership regimes are modeled, open access and sole ownership.32 
The sole owner is an analytical construct used in resource economics. It implicitly 
assumes away all the problems of organization, internal transactions costs, monitoring 
problems, accountability, and most of all, individual incentives within an organization. The 
sole owner rule assumes a single decision-maker that "owns" all of the boats. It has access 
to all relevant information (e.g., biomass levels) with which it determines how to best 
allocate effort each year. With the profit maximizing sole owner, decisions regarding 
whether to add or subtract vessels are based on the results of a search process that compares 
the owner's past decisions to add or subtract boats, with the results of those decisions (i.e., 
whether they were profitable or not). 
The model assumes that harvesters do not have problems finding alternative forms 
of employment and that no regulatory barriers exist to impede entry. It is assumed that 
boats can be bought or leased and are immediately able to enter the fishery. The model also 
assumes that capital is perfectly fungible. Thus, there are no delays in entry and exit. 
Similarly, it is assumed that there is no cost associated with switching fisheries (e.g., with 
switching gear types). 
'' Under open access there are no barriers to entry and exit (e.g., in the form of a license requirement). Entry 
occurs when average profits are positive and exit occurs when average profits are negative. When no profits 
occur, no entry or exit occurs. Since open access assumes there are no barriers to entry and exit (e.g., 
restricting vessels to a fishery), open access is run only with the Big Box model. 
In a simple non-age-structured single species model, the system provides immediate 
feedback to the sole owner, implying a rapid ability to learn. In this model, feedback is 
delayed because the action of the sole owner needs a chance to work its way through the 
system. It may be a few years before the sole owner knows what kind of impact its decision 
has had on the system.33 Additionally, in this model, intervening events can generate 
"noise" in the feedback that the sole owner uses to make it decisions. In the Big Box for 
example, while the sole owner sees an abundance of "cod and begins to direct effort to 
that species, there may be a bloom in "herring" that causes the system constraint to be 
exceeded, which consequently induces a high level of mortality on young "cod" (age 0 and 
I), which is not seen by the sole owner for a few years. The increase in "herring" may 
signal to the sole owner that profits are high and the sole owner may add more boats to the 
system. When the sole owner "realizes" what happened to the "cod" population, it may 
not be able to move effort out of that fishery quickly enough. 
In order to differentiate population signals from the system noise, resulting from the 
variability of the populations, the sole owner bases its decisions on a 5-year trend 
However, in one of the early versions of the model this noise led to the sole owner finding a 
local sub-optimum instead of finding the profit maximizing solution. Therefore, the sole 
owner was given a "memory" of past circumstances that lead to high profits. The sole 
owner "remembers" the ratio of biomass to boats that existed at times of high profits and 
adds and subtracts boats in order to move towards those profitable circumstances. This 
gives the sole owner a more "global" perspective that avoids local optima. Additionally, the 
sole owner considers alternative sources of income that could be gained outside of fishing. 
It does this by comparing the average profits per boat with an arbitrarily set "floor" which 
represents the income that could be generated by a unit of effort outside of fishing. When 
the average profits per boat fall below the "floor" the sole owner removes a portion of its 
boats from the fishery. 
- - - 
33 Due to the delays and noise, the sole owner cannot find the profit maximizing solutions by looking for 
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As noted earlier, switching in both models is done on the basis of profitability. In 
the Little Box model, the sole owner looks at the relative profitability between harvesting the 
species in one system versus harvesting that same species in the other system, and boats will 
migrate towards the more profitable system. For example, the profitability of fishing for 
"herring" one system vs. fishing for "herring" in the other system is compared, and the 
sole owner will move a portion of the boats to the most profitable system. In the Big Box 
model, the relative profitability of each species is compared and the sole owner reallocates 
effort to increase profitability. This does not, however, mean that the sole owner will move 
all of its effort to the most profitable fishery. This is prevented by limiting the amount of 
effort that can be relocated during a given year (i.e., the switch rate). 
Profitability is calculated as total revenue generated minus the total costs. Revenue 
is simply the total catch (pounds harvested) multiplied by the price per pound. Prices for all 
species were held constant, as it was assumed that the fishery was operating in the context 
of a world market. Catch is a function of the number of boats, the available harvestable 
biomass, and the vessel's efficiency. Total costs are a function of the number of boats and 
the operation costs per vessel. In order to more easily interpret model results, prices, 
operational costs, and harvesting efficiencies were kept constant and the same for all four 
harvested species. This effectively eliminates noise that would otherwise be generated by 
variations in these economic variables. Also, it creates a direct link between profits and 
species or system biomass. Hence, monitoring changes in species or system profits is 
equivalent to monitoring species or system biomass. 
the 1~12" derivatives, as can be done with analytical single species models. 
CHAPTER 3: 
RESULTS OF THE MODELS 
Restatement of the Hypothesis 
The models were created with the intention of simulating a hierarchically organized 
complex marine system composed of two subsystems, each constrained by a local carrying 
capacity. Specifically, the models were created with the intention of exploring how feedback 
can enable learning in complex marine ecosystems. Feedback can be defined as "influence 
on a system component mediated by changes induced by that component" (Levin, 1999). 
The process of learning involves first observing changes in the system and then trying to 
discern the results of those changes (i.e., feedback). However, the complex nature of the 
system makes capturing and understanding feedback difficult. 
Complexity and hierarchy theory suggest that because subsystems are more stable 
than the individual populations that comprise them, better feedback can be gained by 
looking at changes in the average biomass in the system (i.e., at the subsystem level) than by 
observing changes in individual populations. The stability of the average biomass (i.e., the 
subsystem level) is due to constraints imposed by a system carrying capacity (e.g., energy 
limitation). Within these subsystems, compensation between species occurs due to 
competition among functionally similar species for available space. The result is that 
although the composition of species within the subsystem can change rapidly, the average 
sum biomass of the species is relatively stable. 
Given this stability, feedback is less "noisy" at the subsystem level compared to the 
species level. This means that feedback will be easier to observe and less ambiguous at the 
subsystem level. In other words, at the species level in the system where dynamics are 
highly variable (more "noisy"), it is more difficult to capture, understand, and adapt to 
feedback. This suggests that more learning and adaptation can take place if rights are 
allocated to harvest multiple species within a subsystem than if rights are allocated to harvest 
individual species across subsystems. Therefore, it is hypothesized that the Big Box model 
will produce more favorable results than the Little Box model. 
Evaluating the Model 
Due to the complexity of the models, testing the hypothesis requires breaking up the 
feedback problem into multiple components and looking for patterns in the results of the 
models. The feedback problem can be divided into three components. The first problem is 
capturing the feedback. The second problem requires an understanding of that feedback 
(e.g., distinguishing signals from noises). And the third problem is being able to respond to 
feedback. 
The initial design of the model minimized all three components of the feedback 
problem. The sole owner under the baseline model is assumed to have perfect information 
about the biological and economic status of the resources, but not causality. Additionally, 
the sole owner knows how to and is able to adapt to that information immediately (e.g., there 
are no decision lags, no barriers to entry and exit, no costs associated with moving its fleet 
around, etc.). Starting with these "perfect" conditions, the model is then altered to better 
explore the feedback problem. This is done in a variety of ways but essentially involves (1) 
impairing the quality of feedback received by the sole owner and (2) hindering the sole 
owner's ability to adapt to changes in the system. The purpose was to observe how well the 
sole owner is able to respond to feedback in a variety of conditions with the hope of seeing 
patterns in the observed results. 
Given the complexity of the feedback problem and the models used, no single 
indicator in the model quantifies how much feedback is captured and used by the sole 
owner. Feedback use is reflected in how the resource is exploited. One can assume that the 
better the quality of feedback and the better individuals are able to adapt to feedback (and 
changes in the system), the more efficiently the resources are harvested. This means that use 
of the resources becomes more economically and ecologically sustainable. It is assumed 
that profits signal to the users what is happening with the biological status of the resource. 
This is because profits are a linear function of the amount of harvestable biomass available. 
With little or no (or poor) feedback getting to the sole owner, one would assume that 
harvesting of resources would be done less efficiently. 
Again, due to the complexity of the models and the nature of the feedback problem, 
both economic and biological indicators were relied on to assess the harvesting efficiency of 
the two models. Looking at multiple indicators provides a better opportunity to see patterns 
in the observed results. 
Wealth, or accumulated profits, is viewed as the most important indicator used to 
evaluate the two models. Since profits are indirectly a function of the harvestable biomass 
available, wealth is also an indicator of the health of the resource. The purpose of the other 
indicators was to aid in our interpretation of the observations that we see in wealth (i.e., to 
check for noises). The other indicators reported were catch (biomass harvested), spawning 
stock biomass (mature biomass), system biomass (ages 2 and and fleet size. 
Running the models 
The model reports annually the results of the year's harvesting activity. The species 
composition of the biomass in the subsystem changes each year due to the harvest and 
changes in the system constraint. The result is that catch is different each year for each 
species, and consequently so is wealth. Looking at one year will not provide much feedback 
about a given simulation. Therefore, in order to evaluate the model it was necessary to 
generate an average over multiple years. The model was run for 500 years and averages 
were then calculated for the last 400 years of each 500-year run. The first 100 years of each 
run were ignored to allow the model to adjust to initial conditions. Each time the model is 
run (i.e., a 500-yr run) the random component on age 1 mortality results in a different 400- 
year average. It was therefore also necessary to generate another average (of multiple 
34 System biomass (ages 2 and up) reflects the population surviving post-settlement mortality. 
runs). Therefore, under each simulation, the models were run 50 times for 500-year 
intervals. The 400-year averages (ignoring the first 100 years) were then averaged for the 
50 runs. Averages for all simulations are summarized in the Appendices. 
Consistency Tests 
Before the models were used to explore the hypothesis, they were tested for 
reliability. A number of tests were done to make sure that the dynamics observed in the 
model conformed to expectations. These tests include dynamics of the populations in the 
absence of harvesting, the response of the species to exploitation, and the implications of the 
kind of harvesting regime on the status of the resource. A final test was done to make sure 
that the only difference between the two models is the kind of property rights regime 
constraining the sole owner. As shown below, the models respond as expected. 
System Dynamics Under No Harvesting 
With no harvesting, the species are variable and exhibit compensation. However the 
overall biomass of the system is stable (Fig 2). The system can be considered energy 
efficient, as the total biomass of the system is stable and the individual populations act as if 
they are food or energy limited. When no fishing occurs, "cod" and "redfish" dominate 
the system. This makes sense because these are the most long-lived of the species in the 
models (with the lowest natural mortality rates). These results represent what we might 
expect in an unfished system. 
Figure 2: System Biomass (ages 2 and up) under 
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System Dynamics Under Two Ownership Regimes 
Two ownership regimes typically described in economics are modeled; open access 
and sole ownership.35 According to economic theory, because no property rights exist 
under open access uncoordinated entry takes place fishery until profits are zero. The result 
is overcapitalization in the fishery (too many boats) and, given sufficient demand, the 
"inevitable" overexploitation of resources. Under sole ownership, property rights are 
assigned to a single, profit-maximizing decision-maker who has an incentive to invest in the 
future of the fishery. According to economic theory, the sole owner is able to maximize 
profits and sustainable use of the resources occurs. 
When the model is run, first under open access and then with a sole owner, it 
responds as expected from economic theory. The biomass of the individual species is 
reduced and the populations are substantially more variable than was observed under no 
harvesting (Fig 3). The biomass at the system level remains more stable than the biomass at 
the species level. The system biomass is also more variable compared to the system in the 
unfished state (Fig 2,3). Compensation between species can also be seen under harvesting 
conditions. Under open access fishing conditions, "sand lance" (the unfished species) 
clearly dominates the system, while the remaining species are now at similar biomass levels 
(Fig 3). However, "cod" slightly dominates among the fished species. 
Under sole ownership, "sand lance" no longer dominates the system and all 
species are at similar biomass levels (Fig 4). Since under open access "sand lance" 
dominates the system and under sole ownership "sand lance" does not dominate the 
system, the model conforms to traditional economic theory. Traditional theory says that in 
the absence of property rights (open access) resources are overexploited. The theory further 
suggests property rights (sole ownership) provide incentives that lead to sustainable use of 
resources. The dominance of "sand lance" in open access suggests that the resources have 
35 Open access is only modeled with the Big Box model because the Little Box model assumes that there is 
some barrier (i.e., license restriction) limiting a vessel to fishing a single species. Open access assumes no 
barriers to entry and exit. 
Figure 3: System Biomass (ages 2 and up) under Open Access Fishing 
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Figure 4: System Biomass (ages 2 and up) under Sole Ownership 
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been overexploited, otherwise there would not be so much "room" for "sand lance" to 
dominate. Therefore, the dynamics of the species under the two property rights regimes 
provide confidence in the models. 
Open Access vs. Sole Ownership 
Further exploration of open access and sole ownership provided additional 
confidence in the model. As expected, open access management reduced harvested stocks 
to low levels and captured zero profits. With results consistent with theory, decision- 
making by a sole owner (under Big Box fishing), was economically and biologically 
superior to open access management (Tablel). The amount of wealth generated in the open 
access regime was significantly less compared with the wealth generated under the sole 
owner in the Big Box model (Table 1).36 Average mature biomass was significantly less 
under open access (Table 1). Average biomass (ages 2 and up) was also significantly less 
in open access (Fig 3d). However, "sand lance" biomass (ages 2 and up) dominated the 
open access system (Table 1). This makes sense because "sand lance" represents the 
untouched biomass in the system and is able to take up the space made available when the 
other species are fished. Average catch and fleet size in open access were greater than that 
seen under sole ownership (Table 1). In general, the result of open access is a depleted 
system largely dominated by the unharvested species ("sand lance"). 
In addition, the model responded as expected to changes in prices and operating 
costs under open access and sole ownership. For example, under open access, increased 
prices led to decreased biomass and consequently decreased wealth. Under sole ownership, 
the model resulted in a slightly greater harvest, increased wealth, and a slight decrease in 
biomass. Decreasing operating costs generated the same results as increased prices. 
36 The wealth that does occur in open access is due to a delayed response to population blooms. When a 
bloom occurs, the resource is exploited by the boats in the fishery at the time of the bloom (resulting in 
profits being generated). Eventually "everyone else" responds, raising costs and ultimately driving profits 
to zero. 
Table 1: Sole Ownership vs. Open Access 
Sole Owner Open Access 
C Wealth 7,190,082 14 1,639 50 737,904 40,482 100 
Ha Wealth 3,8 19,098 166,913 50 347,3 18 23,800 100 
He Wealth 2,844,946 161,190 50 857,739 102,465 100 
C Catch 1,034,233 14,751 50 1,089,846 13,957 100 
Ha Catch 603,832 36,758 50 744,856 12,451 100 
He Catch 472,9 12 36,011 50 870,958 24,132 100 
R Catch 216,811 4,128 50 141 161 100 
M a e e  Bi 
C Mat Bio 1,786,390 95,732 50 1,089,846 13,957 100 
Ha Mat Bio 1,474,734 54,901 50 744,856 12,451 100 
He Mat Bio 1,36 1,465 43,611 50 870,958 24,132 100 
R Mat Bio 1,045,789 64,293 50 282 337 100 
Ha Fleet 277 27 50 987 12 100 
He Fleet 236 26 50 1,095 21 100 
R Fleet 14 1 9 50 352 13 100 
C Bio 3,213,549 74,632 50 2,694,464 34,753 100 
Ha Bio 2,652,404 32,800 50 2,002,674 33,168 100 
He Bio 1,822,274 27,471 50 1,606,3 12 44,336 100 
R Bio 2,180,259 95,249 50 854 1,007 100 
S1 Bio 3,559,502 173,492 50 6,68 1,766 47,664 100 
Averages are for the last 400-years of N runs 
These results are consistent with economic theory and provide confidence in the 
model. The results find that sole ownership is superior to open access, which is consistent 
with the theory of open access, also known as the "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin, 
1968). This theory says that under open access resources are overexploited and profits are 
not maximized, both of which were observed in the model. 
Given the advantages of sole ownership, the remainder of the thesis explores the 
conditions under which sole ownership can capture and respond most appropriately to 
feedback in the system. Specifically, the question explored is whether we should look for 
feedback at the system level (e.g., using the Big Box approach) or the species level (e.g., 
using the Little Box approach). 
Big Box vs. Little Box Under Identical Harvesting Pressures 
One final test was done to make sure that there were no differences in the biological 
sectors of the two models (i.e., that each model responded the same to identical conditions). 
When all fisheries (i.e., species) in the Big Box and Little Box models experienced the same 
harvesting pressures under sole ownership, the results of the models were statistically 
equivalent (Table 2). Harvesting pressures were kept the same by preventing switching and 
entry and exit. These results were expected and confirm that the biological sectors and 
general fishery characteristics are identical between models. Therefore, as different 
harvesting scenarios (with entrylexit and switching) are explored, any differences between 
models must be due to differences in the two harvesting regimes (i.e., Big Box vs. Little 
Box management). 
Baseline Conditions of Sole Ownership: Big Box vs. Little Box 
Results of Baseline 
Under baseline conditions, the two models differ only slightly (Table 3). Although 
average total wealth (accumulated profits) is slightly higher in the Big Box (Table 3), the 
standard deviations of the means overlap. However, the Little Box actually does better in the 
"cod" fishery (Table 3). Similarly, average mature biomass is slightly greater in the Little 
Box - with more mature biomass in the "cod", "redfish", and "herring" populations in 
that model (Table 3). The Big Box model resulted in a higher average mature biomass in the 
"haddock and "sand lance" populations compared to the Little Box model (Table 3). 
Similarly, system biomass (ages 2+) is also only slightly greater in the Little Box 
compared to the Big Box (Table 3). System biomass in the "cod", "redfish", and 
herring" populations were greater in the Little Box, while "haddock and "sand lance" 
were greater in the Big Box model (Table 3). Average catch is slightly higher in the Big 
Box, in all fisheries besides "redfish" (Table 3). The number of boats in the Big Box 
model is also slightly higher compared to the Little Box model (Table 3). 
Table 2: Big Box vs. Little Box under Identical Harvesting Effort 
Big Box ILittle Box 
Ha Wealth 4,300,887 110,504 50 4,284,761 97,513 50 
He Wealth 2,874,350 51,430 50 2,876,781 64,059 50 
R Wealth 768.075 51.960 50 755.949 54.220 50 
C Catch 
Ha Catch 
He Catch 
R Catch 
Mature Bio 
C Mat Bio 
Ha Mat Bio 
He Mat Bio 
R Mat Bio 
Ha Fleet 
He Fleet 
R Fleet 
$ystem Bio 
C Bio 
Ha Bio 
He Bio 
R Bio 
S1 Bio 
Averages are for the last 400-years of N runs 
Table 3: Big Box vs. Little Box under Baseline Conditions 
Ha Wealth 
He Wealth 
Ha Catch 
He Mat Bio 
R Mat Bio 
Averages are for the last 400-years of N runs 
Variability Under Baseline Conditions 
Inter-annual changes in recruitment were used as the indicator of variability (Table 
4). Recruitment here is defined as entry into the harvestable population, except for "sand 
lance" for which recruitment is entry into the "adult" population. Table 4 shows the 
average inter-annual variability in the baseline models for each species in one system and 
for recruitment into harvestable population of one system. Variability in each system is 
nearly identical. 
Table 4: Average Percent Change in Recruitment by Species 
Little 
Big Box Box 
Ave Stdev Ave Stdev N 
Averages are for the last 400-years of N runs 
Recruitment is more variable at the species level in the system than at the system 
level (i.e., harvestable recruitment) except for "redfish". This means that in trying to 
capture feedback from the system37, the Big Box sole owner is dealing with "less" 
variability (at least compared to the Little Box "cod", "herring", and "haddock" 
fisheries). This may be one reason why the Big Box sole owner average total profits were 
slightly greater compared to the Little Box sole owner. 
One would expect the Little Box to do better in the "redfish" fishery because the 
"redfish" population is very stable. However, the slow growing nature of "redfish" makes 
it very relatively easy to fish this species down. This is because this species is less resilient 
to fishing and if the sole owner overshoots its effort in one year, this species will take longer 
to recover compared to the other species. The "herring" and "haddock fisheries are 
more variable, which is why the Little Box sole owner may have had a more difficult time in 
these fisheries, compared to the "cod" fishery. It is possible that the Little Box sole owner 
does well in "cod" because it is not too variable and is fast growing - which means it is 
more resilient to fishing. It is likely that the Big Box sole owner did not do as well 
(compared to the Little Box) in the "cod fishery because by focusing on the average 
harvestable biomass (as an aggregate) it is not able to take advantage of the species 
individual stability and fast growth. 
Unfortunately, we could not explore questions of high levels of variability with this 
model. We found that increasing variability was impossible without killing off one or more 
of the harvested species. In particular, "redfish was very sensitive to changes in variability. 
This is because this species is very slow growing and thus less resilient. Because the 
species exhibit compensation, an "unusual" increase in one species reduces the space 
available for other species. "Redfish cannot easily take advantage of openings in the 
system and so is often eliminated by consecutive growth "spurts" of other populations. 
Sole Owner Response to Impaired Feedback 
In the baseline, the feedback problem faced by the sole owner is minimal. The sole 
owner is assumed to have perfect knowledge of the biological and the economic conditions 
of the resource. It receives accurate information, which it is then able to analyze and use to 
make a decision in a timely manner. This means that economic and biological data are up to 
date and without flaw. The sole owner is further able to implement that decision 
immediately. That is, it adds or removes boats or switches fisheries as soon as it makes its 
decision. This further means that users (employees of the sole owner, members of the 
cooperative, etc.) are made aware of the new rules and are expected to change their 
37 The sole owner looks at changes in profits for feedback. Since prices, costs, and harvesting efficiencies 
harvesting strategies in a moment's notice. In addition, there is no cost associated with 
entering and exiting the fishery. 
This is obviously not realistic of what could happen with a "real world" sole owner 
situation and does not reflect the problems faced in trying to capture and understand 
feedback from the system. Rarely does a resource manager have completely accurate, up- 
to-date information on which to base its decisions. Furthermore, once a decision is made, 
there is a period of time before the decision can be implemented. Also, there are costs and 
difficulties involved in entering and exiting the fishery. For example, buying a new boat is a 
relatively long-term investment. Users would not likely be so quick to enter and exit a 
fishery, given that the boat has little use when not harvesting. In summary, in its baseline 
form, the model strongly understates the feedback problem. 
In order to make the model more realistically simulate the feedback problem several 
changes were made. These changes were made and run independently of each other in 
order to understand the effect they have on the sole owner's ability to make decisions. 
First, the ability of the sole owner to make and implement decisions (i.e., make 
adjustments to its fleet) was made more difficult. The first alteration was to only allow the 
sole owner to make adjustments to the size of its fleet only every 5 years (instead of every 
year). This change was made to entry and exit, not switching. By only making adjustments 
every five years, the sole owner's flexibility is reduced, as it is unable to respond as quickly 
to changes in the system. By only readjusting its fleet every five years, the sole owner 
cannot track changes in the system as well as it can if it adjusts its fleet every year. Another 
way to impair the sole owner's ability to adjust or respond to feedback is to delay the 
implementation of its decision by 5 years. This represents some barriers to entry and exit. 
For example, it may take 5 years to build a boat and find someone to fish it. Also, the delay 
in exit could also represent problems associated with implementing the decision (e.g., 
perhaps the sole owner must give its captains 5-years notice before dismissing them). By 
are held constant, profits are a linear function of the harvestable biomass available. Therefore, variability in 
5 3 
delaying the sole owner's decision by 5 years, its ability to track changes will be greatly 
,diminished. For example, in a given year there may be a bloom in "herring", but the sole 
owner may be responding to a bloom in "haddock that occurred 5 years ago that has 
already been depleted. 
The second way to impair feedback to the sole owner is to reduce the quality of the 
information getting to the sole owner. This was done by creating errors in the information 
and delaying the information getting to the sole owner. For example, creating errors might 
represent poor stock assessments, including measurement (sampling) and modeVstatistica1 
errors. Delaying the information is meant to represent decision-making based on old 
information (e.g., due to lags between when assessments are done and when they are 
interpreted). By degrading the quality of the feedback, the sole owner should have a more 
difficult time learning how to respond appropriately to changes in the system. 
Allowing the Sole Owner to Adjust Fleet Size Only Every 5 Years 
By decreasing the frequency that the sole owner is able to make adjustments to the 
size of its fleet, average wealth decreased substantially in both models (Table 5). The only 
improvement in wealth was seen in the Big Box in the "redfish" fishery (Table 5). 
However, average wealth in both models was still significantly higher than the wealth 
generated under open access fishing (Table 1,Table 5). Average catch decreased in all 
recruitment to the fishery reflects the variability that the sole owner faces in trying to capture feedback. 
Table 5: B 
Ha Wealth 
He Wealth 
Ha Catch 
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Box vs. Little Box: Baseline vs. Delayed Sole Owner Decision Frequency 
Baseline I 5 year Entrylexit frequency 
3ig Box Little Box 
3,819,098 166,913 50 3,033,790 192,550 50 
2,844,946 161,190 50 1,754,155 69,813 50 
603,832 36,758 50 515,260 20,649 50 
472,912 36,011 50 400,700 23,715 50 
216,811 4,128 50 223,906 6,929 50 
Big Box - ~ i t t l e  BOX - 
2,399,75 1 182,538 50 2,087,911 203,705 50 
1,698,175 124,329 50 1,690,059 94,460 50 
342,315 27,823 50 294,257 29,671 50 
247,858 19,506 50 255,110 16,319 50 
197,711 5,619 50 176,207 6,874 50 
Averages are for the last 400-years of N runs 
fisheries in both models, and consequently, average mature biomass increased (in all species 
besides "sand lance") (Table 5). Average system biomass (ages 2+) similarly increased in 
both models (Table 5). In the Big Box, system biomass (ages 2+) increased for all species 
besides "haddock and "sand lance" (Table 5). In the Little Box, system biomass (ages 
2+) decreased in "redfish and "sand lance" (Table 5). In both models, the fleet size 
decreased, but the Big Box continued to have a larger fleet than the Little Box (Table 5). 
The slight advantage seen in the Big Box (i.e., in wealth generated) appears to be due to the 
increased catch, which resulted from the slightly larger fleet. This suggests that the Big 
Box's greater ability to switch makes it able to employ more boat profitably. 
Delay the Implementation of the Sole Owner's Decision 
When the sole owner's entry or exit decision was not implemented for 5 years, less 
wealth was generated in both models (Table 6). The loss was significantly greater in the 
Little Box compared to the Big Box (Table 6). The Big Box generated slightly more 
average total wealth compared to the Little Box under this simulation, in all fisheries (Table 
6). Average catch was also less in both models under this simulation and was greater in the 
Big Box (Table 6). Average mature biomass was higher in the Little Box (in the "cod 
fishery) (Table 6). Average system biomass (ages 2+) decreased only slightly in both 
models (Table 6). In both models, "cod and "sand lance" system biomass increased 
(Table 6). Average Fleet size increased in both models and was greater in the Little Box 
(Table 6), in the "haddock" and "herring" fisheries. 
Error in the Information Used by Sole Owner 
Introducing error into the models (i.e., degrading the quality of feedback), resulted 
in a slight decrease in average total wealth in the Little Box model and a slight increase in 
average total wealth in the Big Box model (Table 7). Thus, the Big Box model continued to 
generate slightly more wealth compared to the Little Box (Table 7). The Little Box 
Box vs. Little Box: Baseline vs. Delay Implementation of Sole Owner Decision 
Baseline I Delay Sole Owner Implementation 
Ha Wealth 
He Wealth 
R Wealth FWfi:' 
L>=m 
C Catch 
Ha Catch 
He Catch 
R Catch 
Big Box Little Box 
3,819,098 166,913 50 3,033,790 192,550 50 
2,844,946 161,190 50 1,754,155 69,813 50 
603,832 36,758 50 515,260 20,649 50 
472,912 36,011 50 400,700 23,715 50 
216,811 4,128 50 223,906 6,929 50 
Big Box ~ i t t l e  BOX 
3,898,365 101,444 50 1,735,754 336,653 50 
3,048,831 103,651 50 2,053,447 240,994 50 
560,555 108,480 50 931,906 77,949 50 
: ' 2;@7,%s1, > ~999 ' * *~d>r@~ ?TYiQ,m9,~26i i - '~d&;fl~%&S%$f 
" "  
1,043,669 1 1,137 50 894,585 21,682 50 
653,360 20,854 50 495,640 13,662 50 
538,899 22,247 50 466,986 20,779 50 
191.457 7.730 50 201.814 10.287 50 
F *& w' %>? >Q4zn,m , ,-3 @@;77@5@ A $ :Yj@$f@"i& C  at Bio 1,786,390 120,584 50 ,769.1 28m * 323 109.587~~~50 
VI Ha Mat Bio 
4 He Mat Bio 
R Mat Bio 
S1 Mat Bio 
Ha Fleet 
He Fleet 
R Fleet 
Averages are for the last 400-years of N runs 
Ha Bio 
He Bio 
R Bio 
S1 Bio 
277 27 50 265 19 50 
236 26 50 18 1 22 50 
141 9 50 120 6 50 
329 17 50 403 42 50 
293 17 50 327 39 50 
171 7 50 143 7 50 
2,652,404 32,800 50 2,391,478 118,374 50 
1,822,274 27,471 50 1,940,301 101,028 50 
2,180,259 95,24950 2,498,076 117,04450 
3,559,502 173,492 50 3,263,744 86,170 50 
2,612,807 29,878 50 2,178,006 106,738 50 
1,775,637 21,070 50 1,663,483 92,000 50 
1,753,630 99,973 50 2,322,680 70,491 50 
3,992,990 128,875 50 3,537,283 94,842 50 
Ha Fleet 277 
He Fleet 236 
R Fleet 141 
cn 
00 
Ha Mat Bio 
He Mat Bio 
R Mat Bio 
Ha Bio 
He Bio 
R Bio 
S1 Bio 
Averages are for the last 400-years of N runs 
S1 Mat Bio 3,559,502 173.492 50 3.263.744 86.170 50 3.963.750 186.270 50 3.519.948 109.314 50 
. . 
1,474,734 54,901 50 1,362,988 911031 50 
1,361,465 43,611 50 1,510,953 100,768 50 
1,045,789 64,293 50 1,248,957 71,164 50 
. . . . 
1,343,171 511737 50 1,282,165 1021496 50 
1,261,485 42,080 50 1,259,695 79,622 50 
896,695 63,320 50 1,l 18,43 1 72,405 50 
generated higher average profits in the "redfish" fishery (Table 7). In the Big Box, wealth 
increased in the "haddock and "herring" fisheries, while in the Little Box wealth 
increased in "herring" fishery and remained the same in the "haddock fishery (Table 7). 
Average catch in both models also increased and there was more catch in the Big 
Box than in the Little Box (Table 7). In the Big Box, average catch increased in all fisheries 
besides "redfish", while in the Little Box average catch increased in all fisheries (Table 7). 
Average mature biomass and system biomass (ages 2 and up) declined in both models, and 
there was more biomass in the Little Box than in the Big Box (Table 7). Average fleet size 
also increased in both models (in all fisheries), with slightly more boats in the Big Box 
fisheries (Table 7). 
Delay Information getting to Sole Owner 
When the sole owner based its decision on 5-year old data (i.e., delays due to data 
collection and analysis), average total wealth in the Big Box sole was nearly the same as was 
generated under baseline conditions (Table 8). The Little Box, on the other hand, generated 
significantly less wealth (Table 8). In the Big Box, improvements were seen in the 
"haddock and "herring" fisheries, while in the Little Box all fisheries produced less 
wealth (Table 8). Average total catch increased slightly in the Big Box, while it decreased in 
the Little Box (Table 8). In the Little Box, all fisheries experienced a decline in catch (Table 
8). In the Big Box, average mature biomass did not change significantly, but there was an 
increase in average mature biomass in the Little Box (Table 8). In the Little Box, total 
mature biomass increased for all species besides "sand lance" (Table 8). Average system 
biomass (ages 2 and up) did not change and remained similar between models (Table 8). 
Average total fleet size declined significantly with information delays in the Little Box, while 
in the Big Box fleet size remained nearly the same (Table 8). 
Table 8: I 
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Conclusions - Imperfect Sole Owner Conditions 
In general, these results suggest when the sole owner's ability to make and 
implement decision is made more difficult, the Big Box sole owner is better able to capture 
and respond to feedback from the system (Figure 5). Under these imperfect conditions, the 
Big Box sole owner is slightly better able to track changes in biomass than the Little Box 
sole owner. 
Figure 5: Average Total Wealth Under Imperfect Sole Owner Simulations. 
Error Bars indicate standard deviations. 
r -- -- - 
Equal Effort Baseline Delay SO. Delay. Errors Old lnfo 
Freq. Implem. 
I SIMULATION 
In each of the imperfect sole owner scenarios, the Little Box sole owner does worse in the 
"cod fishery, compared to its baseline. Recall that it is probably the fast growing, stable 
nature of the "cod population that allows the Little Box to do so well in that fishery under 
baseline conditions. When the Little Box sole owner's ability to make decisions is 
impaired, it is less able to take advantage of the "cod" population's fast growth and 
stability. 
It is important to note again that the variability in the system is not very reflective of 
real world system variability. These results suggest that if system variability were increased, 
then the Little Box sole owner would have a more difficult time trying to capture and 
respond to feedback in the system. It was not possible to test this hypothesis with the model 
because increasing variability was impossible without killing of one or more of the 
harvested species. Nonetheless, we suspect that as the variability is increased, the Little Box 
sole owner would have a more difficult time dealing with system variability than the Big 
Box sole owner. 
Limited Entry 
In considering these results we wanted to try to determine the importance of entry 
and exit to the sole owner in both models. In the limited entry system with switching, initial 
fleet sizes were set approximately to the fleet sizes observed under baseline conditions and 
the same for each model (total fleet size in both models was 1000 boats). Switching still 
occurred within the system in the Big Box model and across systems in the Little Box 
model. The initial total fleet size was slightly less than the baseline average in the Big Box 
and slightly more than the baseline average in the Little Box (Table 9). In the Little Box, 
only the "herring" fleet was slightly reduced. With switching, average fleet size in the Big 
Box that resulted in the limited entry system was less boats in all fisheries besides "cod". 
In the Little Box, average total fleet size was less in all fisheries compared to baseline 
averages. 
The Big Box did much worse under the limited entry system (Table 9). Average 
total wealth in the Big Box decreased significantly compared to the baseline conditions and 
was significantly less than was generated in the Little Box. Only "redfish wealth 
increased in the Big Box (Table 9), this is possibly due to decreased costs with the smaller 
fleet. On the other hand, average wealth increased in the Little Box (Table 9). The two 
fisheries in the Little Box that produced less wealth were "cod" and "redfish" (Table 9). 
Average catch decreased in the Big Box (in all fisheries besides "redfish") and increased in 
the Little Box (in the "cod" fishery) (Table 9). Again, this may be due to the smaller fleet 
in the Big Box and the larger fleet in the Little Box (compared to baseline averages). 
Average mature biomass increased in the Big Box and decreased in the Little Box 
(Table 9). In the Big Box, "herring" and "redfish" mature biomass increased, while in the 
Little Box, only "herring" mature biomass increased (Table 9). Ln both models, average 
system biomass (ages 2 and up) remained nearly the same as under baseline (Table 9). 
However, in the Little Box there was more "sand lance" biomass than in the Big Box. In 
the Big Box, average system biomass decreased for all species besides "redfish" and 
"herring" (Table 9). In the Little Box, "herring", "haddock", and "sand lance" system 
biomass increased (Table 9). Again, these results are probably due to the size of the fleet. If 
the Big Box fleet were set slightly larger, average catch would probably increase (generating 
more revenue, and possibly higher profits depending on the total costs) and the biomass of 
the harvested species would be reduced. It is not surprising that the only species to increase 
in size was "herring", which had a smaller fleet compared to its baseline. If the Little Box 
were allocated fewer vessels then there may be more harvestable biomass and less "sand 
lance". 
The results do not indicate whether entry and exit is more important to one model 
than the other. However, the results do suggest that the size of the fleet set by a limited 
entry system is important and should be considered when implementing such a management 
system. For example, if the Big Box were given a slightly larger fleet then it would likely 
have done better. The fleet size set under this simulation was probably too small for the Big 
Box sole owner and "good" for the Little Box. Given the dynamic and complex nature of 
marine systems, determining the levels that effort should be limited to in a limited entry 
system is a difficult, if not impossible, task. Consequently, unlike conventional fisheries 
models, the models used in this thesis suggest that altering effort levels may not be 
sufficient enough for capturing feedback and learning in complex marine systems. 

Summary and Future Considerations 
The purpose of this thesis was to explore and learn about feedback in complex 
marine systems. Exploration of these two models suggest that allocating harvesting rights 
at the system level may allow users to capture and respond to variability in complex marine 
systems. Under initial sole owner conditions, feedback is captured and understood 
perfectly. It appears that under perfect sole owner conditions (i.e., when feedback is 
captured and not ambiguous) both management approaches are approximately equal in their 
abilities to deal with system variability. As the sole owner's ability to capture and 
understand feedback is made more imperfect (as is the case in real world situations), the Big 
Box approach to management appears to result in slightly better decision-making. 
Continued exploration of the models would have provided a better understanding of these 
results, and consequently greater learning about the nature of the feedback problem in 
complex systems. 
Future explorations with these models should continue to look at the conditions of 
imperfect feedback and imperfect response abilities, specifically how the sole owner is able 
to cope under increasingly difficult conditions. For example, the profit trend signals to the 
sole owner what is happening in the biological sector of the model because profits are a 
function of the harvestable biomass available. If the signal between profits and the biological 
status of the resource included more "noise", it would be more difficult for the sole owner 
to harvest the resource in the most sustainable manner. "Noise" could be easily introduced 
by non-constancies in prices, costs, and harvesting efficiencies. Another way to make the 
sole owner's response ability more difficult in the model would be to introduce costs 
associated with switching fisheries (both across regions and across species). Similarly, 
exploring the assumption of non-perfectly fungible capital, by giving vessels a 20-year life 
span, would offer insight into the feedback problem by making it costly and difficult to 
undo entry/exit decisions. 
It would also have been useful to explore questions regarding the significance of 
recruitment variability in the fish populations. Although it is impossible to make the species 
more variable without killing off one or more species, the individual growth rates and natural 
mortality rates of the species could be altered to determine their influence on the sole 
owner's ability to capture and respond to feedback. In particular, it would be interesting to 
reduce the growth rate of "sand lance" so that it was not able to quickly take up available 
space in the system. This would likely influence the variability in the other species. It would 
also be interesting to find out what kind of variability would result if all five species were 
harvested or if a different species was chosen as the unharvested species (e.g., "redfish, 
with a much slower growth rate and turn over rate). The question of how individual life 
history strategies influence system variability, and thus the sole owner's ability to 
understand and respond to feedback is important and should be explored further. 
Another interesting aspect of complex systems that was not explore in this thesis, 
but could easily be explored with the models is flow between subsystems. Flow between 
subsystems is one way feedback is lost. Larval drift was built into the model, but was 
turned off for the purposes of this thesis. If turned on, the consequence of leakages between 
subsystems could be explored. Depending on how larval drift is modeled, this leakage could 
result in additional "noise" that the sole owner would have to deal with. Also, adding an 
additional subsystem would not be extremely difficult and would allow for more 
sophisticated exploration of flows between subsystems, and of the feedback problem in 
general. 
There are some questions raised with these models that cannot be addressed without 
altering the entire design of the models. If time permitted, or if the models were to be 
recreated from scratch, the most fundamental change would be to include system factors. 
Although the models improve upon the conventional assumption that recruitment is 
determined only by changes in the adult populations, by including the influence of a system 
induced constraint, the model is only concerned with feedback gained from changes in 
fishing effort. Other kinds of feedback that are not species specific include, among other 
things, habitat, spatial distributions, and stock structure. Much of the ecosystem-based 
management and scientific literature is focused on the importance of managing these system 
factors. For example, Fogarty and Murawski (1998) noted the significance of protecting 
habitat structure and complexity. Ames (1997) described how spatial distributions and 
stock structure are important indicators of ecosystem health. Wilson et al. (1999) also 
described how scale rnisperceptions can lead to a different kind of overfishing than is 
typically recognized in fisheries management. Pauly et a1 (2000) described the need to 
prevent what was called "fishing down the foodweb", which is described as a decline in the 
average trophic level. These are only a few of many examples of kinds of system factors 
that are important to understanding the feedback problem in complex marine systems and 
should be included in future models. 
Many marine resource management agencies (federal, regional, and state) are 
moving towards or are considering an ecosystem approach in their attempt to provide a 
holistic framework for managing fisheries." An ecosystem approach to management, 
which would include humans as part of the system, needs to appreciate "multispecies 
relationships as opposed to the single-species focus inherent in the notion of maximum 
sustainable yield or optimal yield," or the conventional approach to management (Langton 
and Haedrich, 1997). The Big BOX approach to management explored in this paper is more 
compatible with such an ecosystem approach than the conventional, Little Box approach to 
management . 
The results of this thesis suggest that in highly variable complex marine systems we 
can better capture feedback and consequently learn more by observing changes that occur at 
the system level than at the species level. This suggests that a Big Box licensing system 
should be considered as part of an ecosystem approach to management. 
See Ecosystem-Based Fishery Management. A Report to Congress by the National Marine Fisheries 
Service Ecosystem Principles Advisory Panel as mandated by the Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries 
Conservation and Management Act. July 1998. 
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APPENDIX 
SUMMARY OF MODEL SIMULATIONS 
Table A.l: Summary of Big Box Model Simulations 
Open Access Same Effort Baseline Delay Freq. Delay Irnplern. Info. Errors Delay Info. Limit Entry 
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PROF C 737,903.83 7,133,770.13 7,190,081.62 6,939,829.1 1 7,024,333.72 6,908,291.92 7,175,396.85 6,497,110.23 
PROF HA 347,318.32 4,300,887.26 3,819,098.01 2,399,751.43 3,898,365.35 4,066,947.74 3,929,197.83 3,601,010.82 
PROF HE 857,739.21 2,874,349.71 2,844,945.91 1,698,174.82 3,048,831.30 3,178,738.71 2,946,907.07 2,704,117.61 
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Table A.2: Summary of Little Box Model Simulations 
Same Effort Baseline Delay Freq. Delay Irnplem Info. Errors Delay Info. Limit Entry 
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Table A.3: Summary of Average Change in Recruitment for all Simulations 
BIG BOX 
4 
4 LITTLE BOX 
Averages are for the last 400-years of N runs 
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